The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation
Gerald F. Davis†
During the five decades after Berle and Means published The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932,1 their analysis became
the dominant understanding of the American corporation. Social scientists, policymakers, and the broader interested public knew about the separation of ownership and control, the potentially fraught relations between shareholders and managers, and the image of the corporation as a
social institution. Berle and Means’s view of an economy dominated by a
handful of ever-larger corporations run by an unaccountable managerial
class inspired scholarship from sociologists (who were convinced they
were right) to financial economists (who wanted to prove them wrong) to
lawyers (who contemplated the rights and obligations implied by this
system).
A decade into the twenty-first century, however, the public corporation may have reached its twilight in the United States. The “shareholder
value” movement of the past generation has succeeded in turning managers into faithful servants of share price maximization, even when this
comes at the expense of other considerations. But the shareholder value
movement also brought with it a series of changes that have undone
many core features of the Berle and Means corporation. Corporate ownership is no longer dispersed;2 the concentration of assets and employment have been in decline for three decades;3 and today’s largest corporations bear little resemblance to the companies analyzed by Berle and
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Means.4 Moreover, there are far fewer of them than there used to be: the
United States had half as many publicly traded domestic corporations in
2009 as it did in 1997.5 In another generation, the Berle and Means corporation may be just a memory, overtaken by new forms of organization
and financing.
In this Article, I draw on a series of recent studies and empirical observations to describe the rise and fall of the Berle and Means corporation. Part I describes the four major features of the American corporate
system as presented by Berle and Means and how this view came to dominate thinking about the corporation among social scientists. Part II
lays out the theoretical challenges to this view that underlay the shareholder value movement and the changes wrought by the 1980s bust-up
takeover wave. In Part III, I describe how each of the four features of the
Berle and Means corporation has been undone over the past two decades,
concluding that the corporation no longer fits its description as a social
institution. It has instead come to resemble the “nexus of contracts” proposed by Berle and Means’s critics in economics. Part IV closes with
speculation about the possibilities for fruitful collaboration between lawyers and social scientists as we contemplate what comes next.
I. THE CORPORATION AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 1932–1982
Berle and Means opened The Modern Corporation and Private
Property with an analysis of the public corporation that proved to be remarkably enduring. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, the
United States had evolved a new form of economic order analogous to
the feudal system that preceded competitive capitalism. The key to this
new economic order was the modern corporation, an encompassing social form that rivaled the state in its far-reaching powers. According to
Berle and Means:
The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a
giant corporation is a tremendous force which can harm or benefit a
multitude of individuals, affect whole districts, shift the currents of
trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to another. The
organizations which they control have passed far beyond the realm
of private enterprise—they have become more nearly social institutions.6

4. The petroleum sector is one notable exception in that the dominant oil companies analyzed
by Berle and Means—primarily the many “progeny” of the original Standard Oil Company—
maintain their dominance today. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 4.
5. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2010), available at http://data.
worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators/wdi-2010.
6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 46.
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Four premises stand out from the analysis that opens The Modern
Corporation. First, “[e]conomic power, in terms of control over physical
assets, is apparently responding to a centripetal force, tending more and
more to concentrate in the hands of a few corporate managements.”7 The
third chapter of The Modern Corporation documents this centripetal tendency. Through mergers and organic growth, assets and employment had
become increasingly concentrated among a relative handful of corporations. By 1930, the 200 largest corporations controlled 49.2% of corporate wealth,8 and if the trends observed by Berle and Means had continued, they would have controlled it all by 1959.9
Second, “beneficial ownership is centrifugal, tending to divide and
subdivide, to split into ever smaller units and to pass freely from hand to
hand.”10 During the decade after the end of the First World War, retail
investment in stocks and bonds grew dramatically, and the number of
shareholders doubled from 2.4 million in 1924 to 5 million in 1927,
doubling again to 10 million in 1930.11 Chapter 4 of the book describes
the broad dispersion of stock ownership among the public, while Chapter 5 shows the consequences for the corporation: 44% of the largest 200
corporations were under effective management control, with no single
entity holding more than 5% of the voting stock.12
Third, large corporations typically make physical products, transport them, or provide infrastructure. The 200 large corporations analyzed
by Berle and Means included 106 industrials, 52 utilities, and 42 railroads, nearly all entailing large-scale physical operations.13 “The factory
system, the basis of the industrial revolution, brought an increasingly
large number of workers directly under a single management.”14 It was
the grand scale of contemporary methods of production that required issuing shares to the public in the first place, because few families had the
wherewithal to fund them. When Ford’s famous Rouge Plant began turning out Model A cars in 1927, for instance, it employed 75,000 workers
and grew from there to well over 100,000.15 The large size of the modern

7. Id. at 9.
8. Id. at 32.
9. Id. at 40–41.
10. Id. at 9.
11. EDWIN BURK COX, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK OWNERSHIP 33 (1963).
12. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 93–94.
13. Id. at 20–27.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Vivian Baulch & Patricia Zacharias, The Rouge Plant—The Art of Industry, DETROIT
NEWS (July 11, 1997), http://apps.detnews.com/apps/history/index.php?id=189. Ford, however, was
the exception to the rule of public ownership, as the company was privately held at the time Berle
and Means wrote, and remained so until its initial public offering in 1956.
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corporation matched the large scale of tangible activities that it performed.
Fourth, corporations are long-lasting relative to the individuals
whose destinies they control. “Bankruptcy” and “liquidation” do not appear in the index of Berle and Means’s 1932 edition and play little conceptual role in the text, in spite of the fact that it was written during the
Great Depression. Rather, like states, corporations were expected to be
enduring features of the societal landscape. Berle and Means opined that
if trends continued, corporations might come to rival states as “the dominant institution of the modern world.”16 They were “economic empires”
that were in “the hands of a new form of absolutism, relegating ‘owners’
to the position of those who supply the means whereby the new princes
may exercise their power.”17 This analogy with feudalism was a recurring motif in the book.
The book closes with a speculative vision of how the nascent corporate system might evolve to take on features of a new and benevolent
feudalism:
Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their
public, and stabilization of business, all of which would divert a
portion of the profits from the owners of passive property, and
should the community generally accept such a scheme as a logical
and human solution of industrial difficulties, the interests of passive
property owners would have to give way. Courts would almost of
necessity be forced to recognize the result, justifying it by whatever
of the many legal theories they might choose.18

In short, the “paramount interests of the community” would trump those
of both shareholders and managers.19
By the 1950s, Berle and Means’s vision of a society dominated by
management-controlled large corporations was ensconced in social
science and in the popular imagination. Management theorist Peter
Drucker, who had studied General Motors under Alfred P. Sloan, wrote
in Harper’s Magazine that in the contemporary American economy,
“[t]he representative, the decisive, industrial unit is the large, mass16. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 356.
17. Id. at 124.
18. Id. at 356.
19. Id. Compare Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a
corporation . . . are necessarily . . . exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as
their interest appears”), with ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION
169 (1954) (conceding twenty years later that the shareholder primacy view had, in practice, been
decisively defeated by the community-centered view).
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production plant, managed by professionals without ownership-stake,
employing thousands of people, and organized on entirely different technological, social, and economic principles” than traditional businesses
controlled by their owners. He described the large corporation as a synecdoche for American society: “The big enterprise is the true symbol of
our social order . . . . In the industrial enterprise the structure which actually underlies all our society can be seen . . . .”20 The ways of the managerialist mass-production corporation had become the operating system of American society, from the farm to the school to the government
itself.
Economist Carl Kaysen claimed that the professional managers
who ran America’s major corporations had evolved into a caste of benevolent elites who took seriously the corporation’s responsibility to the
paramount interests of the community:
No longer the agent of proprietorship seeking to maximize return on
investment, management sees itself as responsible to stockholders,
employees, customers, the general public, and, perhaps most important, the firm itself as an institution. . . . [Moreover, its] responsibilities to the general public are widespread: leadership in local charitable enterprises, concern with factory architecture and landscaping,
provision of support for higher education, and even research in pure
science, to name a few.21

Ralf Dahrendorf, a sociologist, argued that the separation of ownership and control identified by Berle and Means marked a sharp break
with prior forms of economic organization, and stated that there was “an
astonishing degree of consensus among sociologists on the implications
of joint-stock companies for the structure of industrial enterprises, and
for the wider structure of society.”22 America was no longer, strictly
speaking, a capitalist economy, but rather a new kind of industrial economy, and those in charge of business followed organizational imperatives
other than profit maximization. Professional managers were distinctly
different from traditional business owners in their outlook and motivation: “Among classical capitalists, the ‘organization man’ is an unthinkable absurdity. . . . Never has the imputation of a profit motive been further from the real motives of men than it is for modern bureaucratic
managers.”23 And C. Wright Mills, another sociologist, while disagreeing
20. Peter F. Drucker, The New Society: I. Revolution by Mass Production, HARPER’S MAG.,
Sept. 1949, at 29.
21. Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311,
313 (1957).
22. RALF DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 42 (1959).
23. Id. at 46.
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with Kaysen’s sanguine view of public-spirited corporate elites, nonetheless took for granted the view that management had been largely freed
from the demands of finance: “Not ‘Wall Street financiers’ or bankers,
but large owners and executives in their self-financing corporations hold
the keys of economic power.”24
For a generation after the writings of these mid-century theorists,
corporations continued to grow larger and more encompassing. The diversifying merger movement of the 1960s added a new form of megacorporation to the group identified by Berle and Means. Conglomerates
such as ITT, LTV, Gulf & Western, and Litton Industries grew vast
through strings of acquisitions across dozens of industries, joining traditional blue chips like AT&T and General Motors. ITT grew from
132,000 employees in 1960 to 392,000 in 1970, adding Sheraton Hotels,
Hartford Insurance, Continental Baking, Avis Rent-a-Car, and dozens of
other businesses to its portfolio.25 During the same period, GM added
100,000 workers and AT&T added almost 200,000.26 Moreover, this
growth in the size of the largest corporations corresponded to a period of
great economic prosperity and declining income inequality. The Gini
index of income inequality dropped to its lowest level on record in the
United States in 1968, just as corporate employment concentration
reached its apex.27
Berle and Means’s prophecy about the ever-increasing concentration of corporate control seemed to have come true. Policymakers responded by drafting the large corporation into service as a tool for addressing social ills on a grand scale. If a few dozen giant corporations
controlled the bulk of the economy, then efforts at social and economic
reform could get the most leverage by targeting these firms. Thus, during
the years of the Nixon Administration, corporations became a central
mechanism to realize policy goals around environmental protection (the
creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970), workplace
safety (the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970),
product safety (the passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act of
1972), and equitable employment practices (the passage of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, giving the EEOC litigation authority). Corporate concentration may have been bad for competition, but
it certainly made the job of would-be social engineers a lot easier.

24. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 125 (1956).
25. Gerald F. Davis & J. Adam Cobb, Corporations and Economic Inequality Around the
World: The Paradox of Hierarchy, 30 RES. IN ORG. BEHAV. 35, 35–53 (2010).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 47.
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II. THE DOMINANCE OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE 1982–2001
But as the corporation-as-institution was reaching its apex in reality, it was being undermined in theory. In 1965, Henry Manne argued that
those who accepted the premise of managerial hegemony, following
Berle and Means, may have been too hasty. There was a limit to how
much corporate managers could abuse their investors on behalf of themselves or other constituencies. That limit was enforced by a previously
unrecognized “market for corporate control”: poorly managed companies
suffered low valuations on the stock market, attracting entrepreneurs who
could buy control of the company on the market, fire the laggards in
charge, and renovate the firm for a quick profit. Only an outmoded approach to antitrust prevented this from happening on a large scale.28
Others decried the view of the corporation as a social institution as
delusional. Corporations had neither power nor obligations with respect
to their members, who were all voluntary participants. Armen Alchian
and Harold Demsetz, for example, asked:
What then is the content of the presumed power to manage and assign workers to various tasks? Exactly the same as one little consumer’s power to manage and assign his grocer to various tasks. . . .
I have no contract to continue to purchase from the grocer and neither the employer nor the employee is bound by any contractual obligations to continue their relationship.29

Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling combined these ideas
into a comprehensive critique of the Berle and Means view of the corporation. First, it simply didn’t make sense that investors would put their
savings into shares of companies run by unaccountable managers. There
must be forces to compel management’s attention to share price, or else
their company would fail or be taken over as investors shunned their securities and the company’s share price declined. Financial markets, far
from being irrelevant, provided a minute-by-minute report card on managerial quality, and there were a host of mechanisms that gave management incentives to care what the financial markets thought. Second,
the view of the corporation as a social institution that might rival the
state was simply wrong: the corporation was nothing more than a “nexus
of contracts” among voluntary, individual participants. As Jensen and
Meckling explained:

28. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POLIT. ECON. 110
(1965).
29. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972).
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[M]ost organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals. . . . Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside” the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it. There is in a very
real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts)
between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and the consumers of output.30

When it came to the corporation, there was no “there” there. This
view was provocative, contrary to conventional wisdom, and, ultimately,
highly influential.
During the Reagan Administration, the theoretical dream of Manne
and his heirs came true, as financial markets became the North Star guiding corporate decision-making. Three policy changes around 1982 were
particularly consequential for precipitating the “shareholder value”
movement. First, the Department of Justice released a set of merger
guidelines that substantially eased limitations on within-industry mergers. Second, the Supreme Court’s Edgar v. MITE decision31 struck
down a set of state laws limiting hostile takeovers of domestic corporations under the Commerce Clause. Third, based on an IRS ruling in
1981, corporations began to offer 401(k) plans to their employees as a
supplement and, eventually, a replacement for traditional defined-benefit
pension plans.
The first two of these changes helped unleash a wave of hostile takeovers aimed largely at the conglomerates built up during the 1960s and
1970s. Diversified firms were systematically undervalued on the stock
market relative to focused firms in the same industries, a regularity that
was dubbed the “conglomerate discount.” The loss of state-level takeover
protection made firms vulnerable to outside tender offers, and the revised
merger guidelines meant that the parts of conglomerates could more readily be sold to buyers in related industries. In combination with the new
availability of large-scale bridge financing through “junk bonds” and
other means, this created the perfect context for raiders to buy conglomerates, bust them up, and sell the parts for a profit, which is precisely what
happened. During the 1980s, 29% of the Fortune 500 largest industrials
received tender offers, and one in three were ultimately acquired or
merged.32 This was the largest industrial reorganization in the United
30. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309–10 (1976) (emphasis added).
31. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
32. Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory and the Market for Corporate
Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets, 1980–1990, 37
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 605 (1992).
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States since the merger wave at the turn of the twentieth century, which
had created the large corporation as we know it. Of the firms that remained, dozens voluntarily restructured through spin-offs and other
means, and broad, unrelated acquisitions nearly disappeared as a growth
tactic.33 After a decade of mergers, the largest firms actually ended up
smaller than they were at the start, reducing aggregate corporate concentration in the economy.34 As we will see below, the trend in disaggregation continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s as innovative new means
for outsourcing arose in nearly every sector.
The third change—the advent of the 401(k)—had complementary
effects in reinforcing the power of financial markets relative to corporations. First, it helped create a broad new constituency for “shareholder
value,” as an increasingly large part of the population became invested in
the stock market. The proportion of households with money invested in
the market increased from just over 20% in 1983 to more than 50% by
2001.35 It also channeled the vast new pools of capital created through
employee savings through mutual funds, which grew from $135 billion
in assets under management in 1980 to $7 trillion in 2000.36 Broad popular participation in the stock market, coupled with a relatively concentrated set of institutional investors, thus created a strong counterweight to
“imperial” corporate managers.
By the late 1990s, there was wide agreement among corporate managers, directors, shareholders, and many scholars that the corporation
existed to create shareholder value.37 This triumph of the shareholders
was not inevitable. Michael Jensen, perhaps the strongest academic voice
for shareholder primacy, proclaimed the “eclipse of the public corporation” in a 1989 article in Harvard Business Review.38 He argued that the
fundamental conflict between those who own the public corporation and
those who manage it could not ultimately be resolved, that professional
managers were deviously clever in finding ways to avoid the discipline
of outside markets (by adopting poison pills, for example), and that alternative forms of business organization (such as leveraged buyout part-

33. Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The
Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 547 (1995).
34. See White, supra note 3.
35. Brian K. Bucks et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence From the 2001
and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., at A1 (2006), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2006/financesurvey.pdf.
36. 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (2010), available at http://www.icifactbook.org/.
37. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 441 (2001).
38. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989,
available at http://hbr.org/1989/09/eclipse-of-the-public-corporation/ar/1.
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nerships) offered an attractive solution to the problems created by the
separation of ownership and control.39
During the subsequent decade, however, upwards of 3,000 corporations went public in the United States, in industries such as biotechnology, computers, energy, and business services. By 1997, the United States
had 8,851 publicly traded corporations—an increase of more than onethird compared to 1990, and the highest level on record.40 Moreover, the
managers of these corporations evidently had no illusions about the purposes of their firms: they existed to create shareholder value, not to cater
to various alleged “stakeholders.” Consider the mission statements of
two Fortune 100 corporations in the late 1990s. According to the CocaCola Company, “We exist to create value for our share owners on a longterm basis by building a business that enhances The Coca-Cola Company’s trademarks.”41 Sara Lee Corporation took a similar view: “[Our]
mission is to build leadership brands in consumer packaged goods markets around the world. Our primary purpose is to create long-term stockholder value.”42 Any broader conception of corporate purpose seemed to
have been vanquished.
III. THE TWILIGHT OF THE PUBLIC CORPORATION IN THE EARLY
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A decade into the twenty-first century, the core premises of the
Berle and Means corporation have given way to a rather different situation, due in large part to the success of the shareholder value movement.
I will consider each premise in turn.
The first premise, that corporate ownership is centrifugal, has been
undermined by the unprecedented growth of a handful of mutual funds in
the United States. Due to the vast increase in retail and 401(k) investment, mutual funds’ net assets were almost 100 times larger in 2007 ($12
trillion) than they were in 1980 ($135 billion), and the number of shareholder accounts increased from 12 million to over 290 million.43 Moreover, the bulk of this growth went to a handful of well-known mutual
funds; the share of assets held by the top five fund complexes in 2009, at
39%, was about the same as it had been in 1985.44 Thus, name-brand
fund families—in particular Fidelity, Vanguard, and the American
39. Id.
40. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
41. GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA 86
(2009).
42. Id.
43. 2010 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 36.
44. Id. at fig.2.2.
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Funds—grew to become the largest shareholders in corporate America
during the 1980s and 1990s. For actively managed funds such as Fidelity
and the American Funds, this meant that their holdings in particular portfolio companies were often highly concentrated. By the late 1990s, Fidelity was the largest single shareholder of one in ten United States corporations, often holding blocks of 10%–15% or more, even among competitors in the same industry.45 It appears that corporate ownership in the
United States has become more concentrated than at any point since the
heyday of J.P. Morgan in the early twentieth century.46 Ironically, this
renewed concentration is due to the growth of retail investment, which
had led to the dispersion of corporate ownership in the 1920s.
The second premise is that corporate control is centripetal, and that
corporations tend to increase the assets and employees under their control, leading to increasing concentration over time. As previously discussed, corporate concentration began to decline during the 1980s takeover wave, and this trend continued through the 1990s and 2000s. In 1960,
the twenty-five largest firms in the United States employed the equivalent of 6.1% of the private labor force; in 1970, it had risen to 9.3%; in
1980, it was 7.3%; in 1990, it had dropped to 5.8%; and by 2000, it declined to 4.0%—less than half of the equivalent figure thirty years
prior.47
Standing behind these declines in corporate concentration are substantial changes in the organization of production in the United States
economy. These changes might be summarized as “Nikefication.” Nike
is well-known for its modular model of producing shoes and athletic
gear: while the company engages in the design and marketing of its
goods, manufacturing is almost entirely done by overseas contractors,
primarily in East Asia. The theory behind this model is that high valueadded activities (the knowledge-based work of design and marketing)
should be done by the company that owns the brand, while lower valueadded activities, such as assembly and supply chain management, can be
contracted out. Although the Nike model has a long history in apparel,
thanks to Wall Street pressures and the availability of an outsourcing sector, the model spread widely throughout the electronics industry and is
now standard practice in industries from consumer packaged goods to
pharmaceuticals. The articulation of a large sector of generic manufac-

45. Davis, supra note 2, at 12.
46. Cf. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
(1914).
47. Davis & Cobb, supra note 25; see also White, supra note 3 (documenting similar declines
in asset concentration).
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turers (known in electronics as “board stuffers”), often operating overseas, allows even the smallest company to produce on a large scale.
One result of this movement is that a company can be large in revenues and market capitalization while remaining quite small in employment and assets. According to its 10-K for 2010, Nike is “the largest seller of athletic footwear and athletic apparel in the world” with over $19
billion in revenues, a market capitalization of $42 billion, and 700 retail
outlets. Yet it employs only 34,400 people globally.48
Although the prevalence of Nikefication is hard to quantify—the
model does not leave obvious traces in public records—a handful of examples will illustrate its implications. The company with the largest U.S.
market share for LCD televisions in 2010 was not Sony or Samsung, but
Vizio, based in Irvine, California. Vizio’s CEO built the firm earlier in
the decade by recognizing that the parts and know-how to build televisions were readily available on the market—like the components of a
PC—and that the critical element was a distribution channel, which he
duly negotiated with Costco and other big-box stores. The televisions are
assembled by a Taiwanese firm with an ownership stake in privately held
Vizio, and they generally retail at a much lower cost than those produced
by Vizio’s name-brand competitors. By 2010, the company had several
billion dollars in revenues, plans to roll out a tablet computer and a smart
phone,49 and fewer than 200 employees.50
In pet food, over 100 brands, from Science Diet to the Walmart
store brand, are manufactured by Menu Foods of Ontario in a single factory, a fact that was revealed in 2007 when much of the nation’s pet
chow turned out to be tainted with melamine from its Chinese suppliers.51 In pharmaceuticals, the widely used blood thinner heparin, sold by
Baxter International, was recalled in 2008 when it was attributed with the
deaths of at least eighty-one patients and injuries of several hundred
more. It had been produced under contract in a Chinese factory that relied on mom-and-pop suppliers for its critical ingredient, pig intestines.52
And in corporate law, companies that choose to incorporate in Liberia
(such as Miami-based Royal Caribbean Cruises and several other shipping companies) find that Liberian incorporation is handled by an off48. Nike Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (July 20, 2010).
49. Christopher Lawton et al., U.S. Upstart Takes On TV Giants in Price War, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 15, 2008, at A1.
50. About Vizio, VIZIO, INC., http://www.vizio.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
51. Ellen Byron, 101 Brand Names, 1 Manufacturer, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2007, at B1.
52. Gardiner Harris, U.S. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/health/policy/22fda.html?pagewanted=1; House Panel
Criticizes F.D.A. Role in Drug Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/04/23/health/policy/23heparin.html.
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shore vendor located in Vienna, Virginia, near Dulles Airport.53 The
American corporation, in short, increasingly resembles the nexus-ofcontracts described by the financial economists.
Berle and Means’s third premise is that the typical corporation
makes or transports tangible products. But the previous examples hint
that this is no longer the case, and more systematic data provide further
evidence against it. During the first decade of the twenty-first century,
manufacturing employment in the United States declined by one-third,
and by March 2009, more Americans were unemployed than were employed in manufacturing.54 This shift is reflected in the character of the
largest employers. In 1960, the five largest private employers in the
United States consisted of AT&T and four vertically integrated manufacturers—GM, Ford, GE, and U.S. Steel. In 1980, U.S. Steel had been replaced in the top five by Sears. By 2010, however, nine of the twelve
largest employers were retailers, and none were manufacturers. Indeed,
Walmart alone employed as many Americans as the twenty largest manufacturers combined.55
Whereas large manufacturers characteristically have relatively low
turnover, long employee tenures (eight years on average in auto manufacturing), and high wages (over $27 per hour for auto workers), retailers
have high turnover (an estimated 40% annually at Walmart), low tenure
(three years on average), and low wages ($9.33 per hour in “general merchandise retailing”).56 Retail also has characteristically different forms of
work organization. Where Ford’s Rouge Plant employed over 100,000
people at its peak, a typical Walmart Supercenter employs roughly 350
people in a highly modular format. Thus, with Nikefication has come a
substantial shift in the nature of the largest corporate employers; the factory system that precipitated the modern large corporation had become
marginal to employment in the United States.
The final premise is that corporations are relatively long-lived. This
premise was not explicit, but the image of corporations as analogous to
feudal manors makes little sense in a world of high corporate turnover.
53. See DAVIS, supra note 41, at ch. 5 (stating the rise of contractors for U.S. government
work, such as armed protection of diplomats in Iraq, is well-documented elsewhere); Contact Us,
LIBERIAN REGISTRY, http://liscr.com/liscr/ContactUs/tabid/160/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 9,
2011).
54. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DATA RETRIEVAL: EMPLOYMENT, HOURS AND EARNINGS
(CES), http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cesbtab1.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
55. See DAVIS, supra note 41, at ch. 3.
56. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY, http://bls.gov/cps/earnings.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, JANUARY 2004: DISPLACED WORKERS, EMPLOYEE TENURE, AND
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY SUPPLEMENT FILE (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/apsd/
techdoc/cps/cpsjan04.pdf.
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Berle and Means’s prediction that a handful of identifiable corporations
would come to dominate the American economy was not a bad guess.
The half-century after they wrote The Modern Corporation was distinguished by remarkable stability at the core of the corporate economy
compared with what had come before. For instance, of the thirty firms
included in the Dow Jones Industrial Index in 1930, sixteen of them were
still there in 1987, almost six decades later.57 Yet by 2009, all but three—
Chevron, Exxon, and GE—were gone due to bankruptcies, mergers, or
radical reorganizations, such as Woolworth’s rebranding as Foot Locker
or Westinghouse’s transformation into CBS. Recent exits from the index
include GM, AIG, and Citigroup, all of which had inadvertently become
government-supported enterprises due to the financial crisis.
Thanks to Nikefication, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish
which corporations are still with us and which have moved on to their
great reward. Circuit City, for instance, was a large national retailer with
over 34,000 employees and stores across the United States when it fell
into liquidation in early 2009 and its employees were all fired.58 Yet the
familiar logo and brand name live on at www.CircuitCity.com, a website
now operated by Systemax, a Long Island-based direct marketer that
purchased the Circuit City brand and domain name for $14 million at a
bankruptcy auction. Similar fates befell other retailers, such as Linens ’n
Things and CompUSA, indicating that retail may be no safe haven for
stable employment in an era of automated web-based order fulfillment.
Perhaps the most compelling challenge to the view of the United
States as a corporate-centered society is the sheer decline in the number
of public corporations. As Figure 1 shows, the number of public corporations in the United States in 2009 was half what it had been in 1997. This
number had declined by over 21% just between 2008 and 2009. The “eclipse of the public corporation” prophesied by Michael Jensen in 1989
finally seems to have come true, although perhaps not for the reasons he
predicted.

57. DOW JONES INDEXES, DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE HISTORICAL COMPONENTS,
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/downloads/brochure_info/Dow_Jones_Industrial_Average_Histo
rical_Components.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).
58. Circuit City to Liquidate Remaining U.S. Stores, MSNBC (Jan. 16, 2009),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28691963/ns/business-us_business/.
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Figure 1: Number of listed U.S. domestic corporations, 1988–200959
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Cross-national comparisons suggest that this is not a global consequence of the economic downturn. India actually surpassed the United
States in its number of public corporations in 2009, and China also maintained a large set of public corporations. Germany, on the other hand,
was down to roughly 600 public corporations—fewer than Pakistan—
despite its relatively healthy economy.60
In just over a generation, the shareholder value movement had laid
to rest the familiar corporation described by Berle and Means. In recent
years, corporations have grown less numerous, less integrated, less concentrated, more ephemeral, and more constrained by their shareholders.
One consequence of corporate disaggregation is that corporations
cannot fulfill public policy goals as effectively as they could during the
Nixon Administration, when a mere twenty-five firms employed nearly
10% of the workforce. Consider the top economic priority of the Obama
Administration, which is to create more jobs and reduce unemployment.
The widely shared folk wisdom is that the path to greater employment

59. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
60. Id.
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runs through entrepreneurship. The day after Obama’s State of the Union
address in 2010, the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by the publisher of Forbes that stated the case plainly, drawing on the experience of
Steve Jobs and Apple, which had just released its iPad. “Mr. Obama and
his advisors need to grasp this essential fact: Entrepreneurs are not just a
cute little subsector of the American economy. They are the whole game.
They will give us tomorrow’s Apples and the multiplier effect of small
businesses and exciting new jobs that go with them.”61
Yet the very next issue included an article entitled Analysts expect
iPad to give lift to Asian suppliers,62 which contained this statement:
“Like many technology brands, Apple doesn’t actually manufacture most
of its products. It hires manufacturing specialists—mainly Taiwanese
companies that have extensive operations in China—to assemble its gadgets based on Apple’s designs.”63 The article specifically mentions Hon
Hai Precision Industry of Taiwan as the assembler of choice.64 A few
weeks later, Hon Hai lost its previous anonymity when a string of suicides by its workers in Shenzen, China, revealed just how exciting the
jobs created by Apple actually were.65
With just over 34,000 employees around the world, Apple creates
relatively few jobs in the United States with its innovative products because it follows the Nike model of production. And Apple is not alone in
this regard; the brain trust of corporate innovation in the United States
has created a great deal of shareholder value, but not that many jobs.
Collectively, Apple (with 34,300 employees), Google (19,835), Intel
(79,800), Amazon.com (24,300), Cisco (65,550), and Microsoft (93,000)
employed only 316,785 workers, of which 215,485 were employed in the
United States in 2010. For comparison purposes, grocery chain Kroger
had 334,000 workers in the United States. Somewhat more pointedly, the
United States lost 598,000 net jobs in January 2009 alone—the equivalent of 17.43 Apples.66

61. Rich Karlgaard, Op-Ed., Apple to the Rescue?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704094304575029350404353026.html.
62. Aaron Back et al., Analysts Expect iPad to Give Lift to Asian Suppliers, WALL ST. J., Jan.
29, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704878904575030633950504718.html.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. David Barboza, String of Suicides Continues at Electronics Supplier in China, N.Y. TIMES,
May 25, 2010, at B10.
66. Amazon.com Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 28, 2011); Apple Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Oct. 27, 2010); Cisco Systems Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept. 21, 2010);
Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 11, 2011); Intel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
(Feb. 18, 2011); Kroger Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 29, 2011); Microsoft Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 30, 2010).
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The implication of this discussion is that contemporary corporations
provide limited capacity for implementing public policy. Judging from
the employment practices of the most successful technology companies
of the past quarter-century, there is little reason to expect that policies
favoring corporate innovation will lead to a flood of new jobs—whatever
their contribution to shareholder value.
IV. WHAT COMES NEXT?
The history of the American corporation shows that there are critical unsettled periods when policy choices set a direction with longlasting implications. Public corporations were of relatively modest significance in the United States before the turn of the twentieth century.
Nearly all were railroads or utilities; fewer than a dozen manufacturers
listed their shares in 1890, and the largest manufacturer, Carnegie Steel,
was a private partnership. Yet by 1905, thanks to a merger wave engineered by Wall Street that consolidated regional firms into national oligopolies in nearly every major industry, the familiar large-scale modern
corporation was born. As William Roy shows, this outcome was far from
inevitable in the United States,67 and the experience of the rest of the
world showed the viability of functional alternatives, such as industrial
districts.68 Moreover, a number of non-corporate alternatives arose to
challenge the dominance of the public corporation, including mutuals,
co-ops, and municipally owned firms.69
During the 1930s, the fraught relation between financial institutions
and firms was set on a different course due to the Glass-Steagall Act,
which ratified a strong boundary between finance and industry and
created a free-standing constituency for financial markets in the form of
the investment banking industry. Although Glass-Steagall was not the
first time that policy intervened to keep American financial institutions
weak,70 it was perhaps the most consequential. Yet Glass-Steagall was a
choice, not an inevitability.
And as I have argued, policy decisions early in the Reagan years
simultaneously created the conditions for the hostile takeover wave that
unraveled the old corporate order and set in motion the shareholder value

67. See generally WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA (1997).
68. See generally MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY (1984).
69. Marc Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? Cooperative, Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterprise, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1409 (2011).
70. Cf. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
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movement that replaced it. In retrospect, it is clear that 1982 was a turning point, but it could have been otherwise.
The United States now faces a similar critical period. Half of its
public corporations have disappeared through multiple rounds of bubbles, scandals, and corporate failures. The first ten years of the twentyfirst century represented the single worst period of stock market performance in U.S. history. The S&P 500 closed the first trading day of 2000
at $1,455.22. On January 1, 2010, it stood at $1,115.10, having declined
by almost one-quarter over the decade.71 A generation that had hoped to
retire on increased home values and an ever-rising stock market would
require other plans. Not only is an economy organized around public
corporations an increasingly risky place for workers, it is not a safe bet
even for shareholders.
With the ready availability of the organizational technology for disaggregated production (as used by Apple, Nike, and Vizio), alternative
means of large-scale financing (such as private equity), and a proliferation of alternative legal forms (such as LLCs and B Corporations), it is
possible that we are reaching the twilight of the public corporation as the
dominant form of business in the United States. Once again, what comes
next is not foreordained. There is an opening for fruitful collaboration
between social scientists and lawyers in their role as “transaction cost
engineers” to help encourage new formats that better meet the needs of
society, which have been left wanting since the collapse of the old corporate order. As this Article has suggested, the rise and intellectual dominance of the shareholder value concept of the corporation owed a great
deal to the advent of the law and economics movement that connected
lawyers and economists. Perhaps a similar movement could better connect lawyers with scholars of sociology and organizations of the sort
convened by the Berle Symposium. The Berle and Means corporation
served us well for many decades, until the shareholder value movement
ultimately killed it off. It is time to contemplate what comes after its fitful disappearance.

71. S&P 500 Index Historical Prices, YAHOO FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^
GSPC&a=00&b=1&c=2000&d=00&e=1&f=2010&g=w (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).

